routinely sponsored and outfitted civilian hunting expeditions onto the plains. Sheridan, as Hutton observes, "heartily approved of the activities of the buffalo hunters, feeling that they were doing the public a great service by depleting the Indians' shaggy commissary." Sherman and Sheridan regularly provided influential American citizens and foreigners with letters of introduction to western commanders. The letters enabled the influential "to obtain supplies, equipment, military escorts, knowledgeable scouts, and other types of assistance at frontier military posts."6 That accommodating policy allowed the army to advance its goal of exterminating the buffalo while gaining favor with the prominent and powerful. Such hunting parties normally slaughtered buffalo and other game with reckless abandon. William F Cody recounted how the army assisted a party of prominent businessmen who visited Fort McPherson in 1871 as Sheridan's guests. Many officers accompanied the party, and two companies of the Fifth Cavalry provided an escort. Cody remarked that any guest "who wished could use army guns." In fact, the Springfield army rifle was initially the favorite weapon of the hide hunters. The party killed over six hundred buffalo on the hunt, keeping only the tongues and the choice cuts, but leaving the rest of the carcasses to rot on the plains.7
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge, who, like so many frontier officers, was an avid hunter, took three English gentlemen on a twenty-day hunt in Kansas in the fall of 1872. In their excitement the Englishmen killed 127 buffalo, "more buffalo than would have supplied a brigade." The next year the same party killed a comparable number. 8 The high command's most elaborate preparations for a buffalo hunt were those arranged in January 1872 for the Grand Duke Alexis, third son of the Czar of Russia. Sheridan and his military entourage joined Alexis and his attendants in Omaha. A military escort consisting of two companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and the Second Cavalry's regimental band, along with teamsters and cooks, completed the assemblage. All boarded a special train provided by the Union Pacific Railroad and headed for North Platte, Nebraska. In five days of exuberant hunting the party slaughtered hundreds of buffalo.9
Army commanders throughout buffalo country customarily treated distinguished travelers to hunts. Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs George W. Manypenny observed that "in the country surrounding military posts the pursuit of the buffalo and other game is an amusement that the officers engage in, and the visitors to the posts are generally entertained with a hunt." Post commanders often furnished their most But punishing the elusive plains tribes by defeating them in conventional battles was extraordinarily difficult. Infantrymen were virtually useless in pursuing hostile warriors so long as there was grass for their ponies. And as for the cavalry, Colonel Philippe Regis de Trobriand, French aristocrat and veteran commander of volunteer Union forces in the Civil War, summed it up accurately when he wrote: "In brief, the movement of Indian horsemen is lighter, swifter, and longer range than that of our cavalry, which means that they always get away from us."14 Frustrated bluecoats, unable to deliver a punishing blow to the so-called "Hostiles," unless they were immobilized in their winter camps, could, however, strike at a more accessible target, namely, the buffalo. That tactic also made curious sense, for in soldiers' minds the buffalo and the Plains Indian were virtually inseparable. When Captain Robert G. Carter of the Fourth Cavalry referred to the "nomadic red Indian and his migratory companion, the bison," he linked the two together in a manner typical of military men. Soldiers who associated the buffalo with the Indian so inseparably could even occasionally pretend that slaughtering buffalo was actually killing Indians. Thus, on the buffalo hunt staged for Russia's Grand Duke Alexis, Chalkey M. Beeson, a westerner hired as a guide, describes what happened when the animals were found: "Custer, who was in charge of the hunting party, stopped and said, 'Boys here's a chance for a great victory over that bunch of redskins the other side of the hill. Major B., you will take charge of the right flank, I will attend to the left. General Sheridan and the infantry will follow direct over the hill. Ready! Charge!'"'5 Doubtless the commander who pretended that buffalo were "redskins" was a rarity, but the commander who used buffalo for shooting practice was not. Custer, General John Gibbon, Colonel Benjamin F. Grierson, and Colonel George A. Armes were among the officers who ordered their raw pony soldiers to chase running buffalo to teach these troopers how to shoot from horseback. Such hunts also broke the monotony of the daily routines of the campaign or post, provided good exercise for men and horses, and were, in the words of one lieutenant, "as good a system of scouting as could be devised for the vicinity of the camp." General Hugh Lenox Scott recalled that the army also encouraged officers to take hunting leaves, provided they would prepare maps of the terrain traversed. 16 Commanders in the field and at military posts issued hunting passes freely to their seasoned troops so as to obtain fresh meat to supplement vapid army rations. Such buffalo hunting would have been far more justifiable had it not been so wasteful.
Officers stationed at Forts Hays and Wallace took a heavier toll in animals in a match that was dubbed "the buffalo shooting championship of the world." Each team placed a $500 bet on its own hunter, "Buffalo Bill" Cody and the well-known scout "Medicine Bill" Comstock, respectively. Cody downed no less than sixty-nine animals in three runs; Comstock killed forty-six.21
On another occasion Major Frank North, commander of a celebrated battalion of Pawnee scouts, afforded Cody an opportunity to exhibit his deadly marksmanship. While on their march along the Republican the Pawnees spotted a herd of buffalo that they planned to fall upon. Cody wanted to join the hunt, but the Pawnees objected to North saying, "the white talker would scare them away."22 North relented and, unaccompanied by Cody, the Pawnee scouts bagged twenty-three animals. Later that day, when another herd was sighted, North insisted that Cody be given a chance to prove his skill. Cody responded by slaying forty-eight buffalo in thirty minutes.
The two officers called him in to help form an accurate estimate of the numbers of buffalo in a one-hundred-mile-wide strip between Fort Dodge and Camp Supply. Wright remembered that the officers initially estimated the numbers to be ten billion animals. But then the incredulous Sheridan decided that such an astronomical number "won't do." So, according to Wright, "they figured it again, and made it one billion. Finally they reached the conclusion that there must be one hundred million; but they said they were afraid to give out these figures; nevertheless they believed them."33
Believing that there were at least one hundred million buffalo in the southern herd alone, Sheridan was forced to abandon all hope of using his tiny army to wipe out the animals. At that time, Sheridan also assumed a less aggressive position toward the plains tribes so as to accommodate President Grant's "Peace Policy" toward the Indians. As historian Francis Paul Prucha has written, Grant's Peace Policy reflected "a state of mind, a determination that since the old ways of dealing with the Indians had not worked, new ways which emphasized kindness and justice must be tried. The theory that the buffalo should be killed to deprive the Indians of food is a fallacy, as these people are becoming harmless under a rule of justice. I earnestly request that you bring this subject before Congress with the intention of having such steps taken as will prevent this wicked and wanton waste, both in the lives of God's creatures and of the valuable food they furnish.37
In addition, some frontier officers had immoderate pride in the fighting ability of their own military units or in the United States Army as a whole. The flamboyant "Long Hair" Custer boasted that he "could whip all the Indians on the Continent with the Seventh Cavalry." The equally arrogant and ill-fated Captain William J. Fetterman, who crowed, "give me eighty men and I would ride through the whole Sioux nation," also exemplifies the type.38 To such foolish men the notion that the army had to resort to wiping out the buffalo in order to subdue mere "savages" was not only preposterous, but it also reflected badly on the army's fundamental competence.
Officers who viewed themselves as true sportsmen also disdained the great buffalo slaughter because it bore no resemblance whatever to the so-called "noble pastime." Lieutenant Colonel Albert Brackett of the Second Cavalry expressed this view to Bergh: "All reports about fine sport and good shooting are mere gammon. It would be equally good sport, and equally dangerous, to ride into a herd of tame cattle and butcher them indiscriminately. The wholesale butchery of buffaloes upon the plains is as needless as it is cruel."39 Lieutenant Colonel Dodge, who fancied himself a bona fide sportsman, regarded buffalo as "the most unwieldy, sluggish, and stupid of all plains animals." To the hunter on foot, buffalo were by no means difficult to kill in large numbers. "If not alarmed at sight or smell of a foe," wrote Dodge, "he will stand stupidly gazing at his companions in their death throes until the whole herd is shot down." To be sure, Dodge regarded buffalo hunting on horseback as exciting and dangerous. But though 36Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1872, pt. 2, Appendix, 179-80. 37 Kansas Daily Commonwealth (Topeka), 2 February 1872. chasing buffalo was thrilling to the novice, Dodge thought that "frequent repetition is like eating quail on toast every day for a month-monotonous."40
The more the "pot hunters" annihilated the buffalo for profit, the more sports-minded officers like Dodge disdained buffalo hunting. In the spring of 1871, Dodge himself was forced to kill twenty-six buffalo in order to split a herd that was stampeding down upon him. Apologetically he recalled that this was "the greatest number of buffalo that my conscience can reproach me for having murdered on any single day. I was not hunting, wanted no meat, and would not voluntarily have fired at these herds. I killed only in self-preservation, and fired almost every shot from the wagon."41
In the early years of Grant's first presidential term, because the army's high command was obliged to give the Peace Policy a chance to succeed and because Sheridan himself then believed the buffalo were too numerous to be rapidly destroyed, the army temporarily abandoned its efforts to exterminate the animals. This is not, by any means, to imply that the blue-coated soldiers' prodigal killing of the buffalo ceased, for the army had no difficulty in rationalizing its excesses. Even before the end of Grant's first term, however, events made it evident to the army's high command that the buffalo must and could be annihilated.
Intensified Indian attacks on the southern plains in the early 1870s compelled the army to forsake peaceful methods for resolving the Indian problem. There, the off-reservation tribes had to be forced to give up their traditional nomadic existence and agency Indians had to be coerced into remaining on their assigned lands. Despite the danger of Indians, however, the hide hunters returned to Texas to continue their bloody work. In response, conservation-minded men in the state legislature introduced a buffalo protection bill in 1875. The prospect of saving the herds alarmed Sheridan who, it is said, appeared before a joint session of the Texas Senate and House in that year. The general supposedly told the legislators-no official record of this meeting has been found-that they were making a sentimental mistake in attempting to protect the buffalo. In his published reminiscences, the aging buffalo killer John R. Cook recalled Sheridan's testimony:
He told them that instead of stopping the hunters they ought to give them a hearty, unanimous vote of thanks, and appropriate a sufficient sum of money to strike and present to each one a medal of bronze, with a dead buffalo on one side and a discouraged Indian on the other. He said, 'These men have done in the last two years, and will do more in the next year, to settle the vexed Indian question, than the entire regular army has done in the last thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary; and it is a well-known fact that any army losing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage. Send them powder and lead, if you will; but, for the sake of a lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated.'47 Cook, himself a buffalo runner, may appear to some to be a biased witness, for he regarded his occupation as a patriotic service and proudly cited Sheridan's words as proof that the army, the cutting edge of civilization, heartily approved the work of the hide hunters. Nevertheless, Cook's account is credible. Sheridan, as will be seen, soon opposed efforts to protect the northern herd. Moreover, Grant himself no longer wished to preserve the herds. In 1874, he pocket-vetoed a bill to protect the buffalo that had passed both houses of the Congress. In essence, the bill made it unlawful for any non-Indian to kill a female buffalo or to kill a greater number of males than were needed for food. This might seem like cruelty and wasteful extravagance but the buffalo, like the Indian, stood in the way of civilization and in the path of progress, and the decree had gone forth that they must both give way.... The same territory which a quarter of a century ago was supporting those vast herds of wild game, is now covered with domestic animals which afford the food supply for hundreds of millions of people in civilized countries.56 Was Miles's allusion to "the decree" that "had gone forth" actually a reference to a military order that had been issued for the destruction of the buffalo? Brigadier General Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Carlisle Indian School, testified that such an order was actually given. Pratt, who was a Tenth Cavalry lieutenant in charge of Indian scouts during the Red River War, recalled from his retirement that "the general destruction of the buffalo was ordered as a military measure because it was plain that the Indians could not be controlled on their reservations as long as their greatest resource, the buffalo, were so plentiful."57
No such written order has ever been found in the extant military records, but this is not surprising. It is probable that Sheridan deliberately refused to issue the relevant written orders knowing that orally conveyed orders could be more easily concealed or more plausibly denied. His Civil War experience had not only taught him the value of destroying the enemy's resources, it had also taught him that the perpetrators of such warfare were despised and vilified by its victims and their supporters. Why subject himself and the army to avoidable Indian enmity and humanitarian disapproval? And why encourage an impression that the army was not competent enough to subdue 55 southern plains in the mid and late 1870s; and the near extermination of the great beasts on the northern plains in the early 1880s. Sheridan was the officer most responsible for promoting the annihilation. But because of his tendency, when dealing with contentious or potentially embarrassing matters, to issue oral rather than written commands, document-minded historians have failed to appreciate the army's covert role in the great buffalo slaughter. Undeniably, a few individual officers opposed the destruction, for as historian Sherry C. Smith has shown, "there was no monolithic military mind"; but these dissenters proved unable to influence events.69
In the end, the frontier army's well-calculated policy of destroying the buffalo in order to conquer the Plains Indians proved more effective than any other weapon in its arsenal. Too small and too inept to vanquish the plains tribes expeditiously, the army aided and was in turn aided by the "sportsmen" and professional hunters who, along with the army itself, managed to destroy the Indians' staff of life. With the mainstay of their diet gone the Indians had no choice but to accept a servile fate on a reservation where they could subsist on government handouts. 
